An experiment with two-way offers into court: restoring the balance in pre-trial negotiation by Brian G Main & Andrew Park
The impact of defendant offers into court on
negotiation in the shadow of the law: experimental
evidence




April 1999The impact of defendant offers into court on negotiation in the shadow of the
law: experimental evidence




A common procedural arrangement that is thought to influence the pre-trial settlement
of civil disputes is one which allows the defendant to make an offer to settle which, if it
is rejected by the plaintiff and not subsequently bettered by the judge’s trial decision
,will affect the division of the legal costs between the two sides.  Operating under
Federal Rule 68 in the USA, as “offers to settle” or “payments into court” in England
and Wales, and as “tenders” in Scotland, these devices are generally assumed to
encourage settlement.  This paper extends the theoretical model of Miller (1986) and
Chung (1996a) to the British context, and presents some experimental evidence on
how agents react to such arrangements.  The rule seems to have little empirical impact
on the propensity to settle and to favour the defendant in terms of the level of
settlement.
JEL Classification: C70 and K40.
*This research was funded by ESRC Research Grant No. R000237392.  The authors
would like to thank Michael Bacharach, Ken Binmore, John Hey and Alan Peacock for
their encouragement in the early stages of this research. Thanks are also due to two
anonymous referees for their helpful and constructive comments.1
1. Introduction
Recent official reports by Cullen (1995) and Woolf (1996) demonstrate substantial
concern with the delay and cost of resolving disputes in the civil courts.  The fact is, of
course, that most disputes never go near a court, and of those that do some 95% settle
before the formal trial stage.  Nevertheless, the legal procedures of the court room
exert an influence that extends well beyond the relatively small number of cases that
are formally resolved by judges.  Most disputes are settled, in the well-known phrase
of Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979), through bargaining in the shadow of the law.  The
parties know that, failing all else, there is usually a legal remedy available.
In addition, although most aspects of legal procedure are concerned with notions of
accuracy and equity, there are some procedural arrangements that have been
introduced with the specific intent of facilitating settlement by bringing the parties
together, so avoiding the need for judicial intervention.  In some ways, the choice
between the American rule of cost shifting (each side pays its own legal costs
irrespective of the outcome) and the English rule of cost shifting (the losing side pays
the costs of both sides) can be viewed as being influenced by such concerns1. Less
contentiously, most practitioners would describe the procedural rules that allow the
defendant to make “payments into court” as being specifically designed to encourage
settlement.  It is the workings of such offers into court rules that this paper sets out to
study.
The basic impact of such a rule is to make any post-trial allocation of costs offer-
dependent.  Thus, under the English rule, assume the defendant offers the plaintiff
some £10000 to settle but the plaintiff declines.  If this offer is officially recorded
following the required procedure (which is without prejudice, as the procedure ensures
that the judge remains unaware of the existence of such an offer until after the formal
                                               
1 See Main and Park (1998) for some experimental results on this difference.2
resolution of the case) and the judge subsequently finds for the plaintiff but awards
damages of only £8000, then the allocation of costs is altered.  Rather than being
liable, as the loser, for all costs2, the defendant only has to pay the costs up to the time
that the offer was lodged.  Thereafter, all trial related expenses arising are the
responsibility of the plaintiff.  As most costs are incurred at the trial stage (i.e., after
the offer has been rejected), this is a significant departure from the loser-pays rule.
The logic behind the arrangement is that it provides the defendant with an incentive to
make “realistic” offers, as in so doing there is an increased chance of avoiding expenses
i.e., offering more is cheaper in terms of expected cost.  It also encourages the plaintiff
to think carefully before rejecting a defendant’s offer that is reasonable.
This arrangement operates under the label of “tenders” in Scotland and a variant of it
can be found in Federal and state law in the USA.  Federal Law 68 allows the shifting
of expenses (although not including lawyers’ fees) in federal cases where an offer to
compromise has been made and the plaintiff has failed to beat the offer in court.
California Rule 998 is one example of the very many state variants of this procedure.
The standard model used to describe negotiation in the shadow of the law, and the one
we shall be extending below, is due to Landes (1971), Posner (1973) and Gould
(1973).  This uses the expected outcome of each party at trial as the starting point.
Thus, under the American rule, the plaintiff expects to win the case with a certain
probability and to be awarded an expected level of damages if successful.  From this
award, lawyers fees and other litigation expenses have to be deducted.  The defendant
will expect to lose the case with a given probability and in defeat faces being held liable
for an expected level of damages.  In addition to this, there are the costs of the
litigation.  Thus, even if both sides have identical expectations of trial outcomes, they
are separated by the total litigation costs in terms of possible gains by early settlement.
If each is pessimistic about trial outcome (i.e., the plaintiff expects to do not very well
and the defendant expects the plaintiff to do very well), then the gap, and hence the
                                               
2 More strictly speaking, for own costs and the taxed costs of the other side (‘standard basis’) ￿
where taxed costs are generally significantly less than the full level of expenses incurred (‘indemnity
basis).3
gain from settlement, increases.  On the other hand, if both sides are optimistic, then
the expectation of the plaintiff may be so high and the expectations of the defendant so
low that they completely swamp any litigation costs, thus making settlement unlikely.
The imposition of the offers-into-court procedure may seem from this perspective to
have little impact on the settlement range, other than to shift it towards more modest
levels (and hence in favour of the defendant) by shifting some of the litigation costs
onto the plaintiff ￿ on those occasions when the plaintiff goes to trial and fails to beat
an offer.  As we shall see below, things are, in fact, not quite so simple as the cost
shifting rule introduces an aspect of strategic behaviour.
It is the purpose of this paper to offer some empirical evidence on the impact of offers-
into-court rules by presenting data obtained under experimental conditions.  The
second section of the paper generalises the Landes-Posner-Gould model for the
English system by extending a model due to Miller (1986) and Chung (1996).  Section
three offers a brief description of the set-up of the experiment that we conduct and
section four presents the results from the data so obtained.  The paper ends in section
five with a brief discussion of the policy implications of these results.
2. Theoretical Model
In his section we extend Chung (1996) by examining his model in the context of the
English rule for allocating legal costs as opposed to the American rule.  In addition, we
make explicit the probability of the plaintiff’s claim being rejected should the case end
up in court3. In what follows, it is assumed that both sides have identical and consistent
views as to the chances of plaintiff success at trial and the likely damages award (if
any). This reflects the legal intent that there be no ‘trial by ambush’, but that both sides
have agreed access to the available information (through ‘discovery’ etc.).
                                               
3Chung (1996) deals only with the American rule and has no need to make this distinction as under
the American rule both sides pay their own costs - who wins or loses the case is not important in
deciding the costs that must be paid by each side. The use of the English Rule (the loser pays)
complicates the analysis by requiring that there be a ‘losing’ side.4
Let P denote the probability that the plaintiff makes a successful claim and let x denote
the size of the court judgement awarded if the case goes to court and the plaintiff is
successful. This judgement is assumed by both sides to be between xmin and xmax.
We denote the cumulative probability distribution of court outcomes, given that the
case is successful, by Q(.).  Thus, Q(x*) denotes the probability that the court award,
given the case is successful, will be less than or equal to x*.  The total costs in the case
are F, this being the sum of the plaintiff’s expected costs, Fp, and the defendant’s
expected costs Fd.  The total costs, F, are assumed to be positive.  We denote the
expected court award (‘damages’) as J where:
J P xdQ x
x
x




The expected court award is thus equal to the probability that the case is successful
times the expected damages. The plaintiff’s net expected gain from trial, Tp, can be
expressed as:
T J F p p = - (2)
Equation 2 states that the plaintiff’s net expected gain from trial is the expected court
award minus the expected costs.  We assume that the plaintiff has an incentive to bring
suit, in the sense that Tp is positive.  The defendant’s expected loss from trial can
similarly be expressed as:
T J F d d = + (3)
The defendant’s expected loss from trial is the sum of the expected court award
(allowing for the possibility that the case is dismissed) plus the defendant’s expected
costs. The litigation differential, LD, is defined as the difference between the
defendant’s loss and the plaintiff’s gain from trial.  From (2) and (3) we have:5
LD T T J F J F F F F d p d p d p = - = + - - = + = ( ) ( ) (4)
Thus, when both parties have the same belief about the court outcome (Jp=Jd=J), the
litigation differential is equal to the total (expected) court costs, F.  If both sides are
optimistic about the court outcome (Jp>Jd) then the litigation differential will shrink
and may become negative, leaving no incentive to come to an out-of court settlement.
And if both sides are pessimistic about the court outcome (Jp<Jd) the litigation
differential would be larger, providing an enhanced incentive to reach an ou-of-court
settlement. As the impact of cost shifting rules will be proportionate, whatever the
convergence or otherwise of damages expectations, the remaining analysis will focus on
the identical beliefs situation.
2.1 The English rule
Under the English rule, the party who loses the case pays all the costs.  We can thus
express the expected costs for each side as follows:
F d = P F
F p = (1- P)F (5)
Using (2) and (3) we can express the plaintiff’s expected gain from trial and the
defendant’s expected loss as:
T P xdQ x PF



















2.2 The English rule with defendant offers into court
To recap, if the defendants are able to make offers into court and if such an offer is
rejected, then if the plaintiff fails to beat the defendant’s offer when the case later goes
to court, then the plaintiff is liable for the costs4.  Note that the plaintiff can fail to beat
the defendant’s offer in two senses.  The first is if the case is rejected by the judge.  The
second is if the judge finds in favour of the plaintiff but makes a damages award that is
less than the offer already made by the defendant and lodged with the court5.  In this
case we can express the  expected costs for each side, given that the defendant has
made an offer into court of O, as follows:
F PF Q O
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In equation 7 the plaintiff is liable for the costs if the case is rejected or if the case is
accepted and they fail to beat the defendant’s offer of O.  The defendants are only liable
for costs if the case is successful and the plaintiff is awarded more than the offer into
court.  We can thus express the defendant’s expected loss from trial and the plaintiff’s
expected gain as follows:
T P xdQ x PF Q O
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4 In practice, the plaintiff in such an event is liable for the costs of both parties only as from the date
that the offer is made.  In general the bulk of costs arise at or near the trial date (and, therefore, after
the offer is made).  For the purposes of this paper we shall assume that the whole of the costs involved
(F) falls on the unsuccessful plaintiff who has not beaten the offer.
5 In the first of these two senses the plaintiff, as the ‘loser’ of the case, would be liable for the costs
regardless of any defendant offer into court.7
2.3 The settlement range, the conventional settlement range and the
refined settlement range
The (standard) settlement range is defined as the set of settlement offers that both the
plaintiff and the defendant would prefer to going to trial, i.e., the range of ultimatum
offers that would be accepted.  The plaintiff will prefer any offer that is greater than
their expected gain from court and the defendant will prefer any offer that is smaller
than their expected loss.  The settlement range is thus given by [Tp,Td] and is equal to
the litigation differential LD6.  Here the settlement range is that range of settlements
where both parties are better off than their respective expected outcomes from going to
trial (sometimes called the Zone of Possible Agreement, ZoPA).
When a defendant has the ability to make offers into court, this unadorned notion of the
settlement range is no longer useful.  The reason is that the expected gain to the
plaintiff and the expected loss to the defendant are conditional on any offer into court
made by the defendant.   At the point at which the defendant makes an offer into court,
the expected court outcome changes for both sides and this change is dependent on the
offer into court that is made7.  Neither the pre-offer settlement range (using the threat
values before any offer is made) nor the post-offer settlement range (using the threat
points after the offer is made) is adequate to examine the set of possible settlements
under defendant offers into court.  Chung (1996) defines the conventional settlement
range as the set of settlement offers that the defendant has an incentive to make and the
plaintiff has an incentive to accept if the only alternative is going to trial.






min.  This allows us to solve uniquely for the value O
min,
which  is the amount of the offer into court by the defendant that makes the plaintiff’s
expected gain from trial under such an offer into court the same as the offer itself, once
                                               
6The (standard) settlement range is equal in magnitude to the litigation differential as LD = Td - Tp.
7 In other words, once the defendant makes an offer into court, the threat points of each side shift but
difference between them (the litigation differential) remains the same.8
the offer is made and rejected8.  For any offer smaller than O
min
 the plaintiff is better off
by going to trial9 and will thus reject the offer.  We thus have O
min as the bottom of the
conventional settlement range.  The top of the settlement range will be again given by
Td, as the defendant will be better off by making any offer that is lower than their loss
at trial, given that trial is the only alternative.
We can express the conventional settlement range for the two rules (from equations 6
and 8) as follows:
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[ ] [ ]
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where CSRE is the conventional settlement range under the English rule alone and
CSRDOC is the conventional settlement range under the English rule with defendant
offers into court.
It is important to remember that even under offers into court the defendant is better off
by agreeing to any demand made by the plaintiff that is less than the Td, if the only
alternative is going to court.  It would thus appear that the size of the conventional
settlement range is raised by defendant offers into court and the settlement range is
shifted downwards provided P.F.Qd(O) > 0 or, intuitively, provided the defendant
makes an offer that is greater than the minimum possible court award10.
An important point made by Chung (1996) that the conventional settlement range
requires only a comparison between the offer made and each side’s belief’s about trial
outcome.  It does not require a comparison of the offer with other offers.  Chung
                                               
8 From the second part of equation 8, O
min
 = J - (1-P) F -PF Q (O
min). Because Q(O
min)>0, P‡0, F‡0
then  Omin £ J-(1-P)F where J-(1-P)F is the bottom of the conventional settlement range under the
English Rule alone (from equation 6). Thus, the (conventional) settlement range expands. See
equation 9.
9 The effect of risk aversion is examined in Section 2.5.
10If this is not the case, defendant offers into court cannot come into play and as such will have no
effect.9
defines an offer, O1 as being equilibrium-dominated if there exists another possible
offer, O2, such that the worst the player can do with O2 is better than the equilibrium
payoff she will receive with O1.  Chung (1996a, p.275) then defines the refined
settlement range as that which eliminates all equilibrium dominated offers from the
conventional settlement range.  The equilibrium domination argument is not relevant
under the English rule only, but does call for refining of the conventional settlement
range under offers into court.




max.  This, again, allows us
to solve uniquely for O
max, which is the level of an offer into court by the defendant that
makes the defendant’s loss from trial, after the offer has been made and rejected, the
same as the offer.  If the defendant made an offer greater than O
max
 then she would be
better off by going to trial than having this higher offer accepted.  Thus any offers
higher than O
max
 are equilibrium dominated and are eliminated from the refined




].  The upper
bound of this range is, of course, dependent on the defendant having made an offer into
court of O
max
.  The defendant will never make an offer higher than O
max and, equally,
will not accept a plaintiff demand higher than O
max
 if she knows she has the ability to
make a such an offer into court11.
The possible settlement ranges – the conventional settlement range under the English
rule alone, CSRE, the conventional settlement range under the English rule with
defendant offers into court (DOC), CSRDOC, and the refined settlement range under the
English rule with defendant offers into court, RSRDOC - are illustrated in Figure 1.
Under the English rule alone, the threat point of the plaintiff, Tp, will be equal to the
plaintiff’s (constant) expected return to trial (from equation 2), shown by the lower
horizontal line in Figure 1.  The threat point of the defendant, Td, is given by the
defendant’s expected loss from trial (from equation 3) and is the higher horizontal line
                                               
11 From the first part of equation 8, O
max=J+PF[1-Q(O








this equation 9, shows that RSRDOC£CSRDOC..10
in Figure 1.  The conventional settlement range is simply those offers that lie between
these two amounts.  The diagram uses a 45￿ line to map these onto the horizontal axis.
Under the English rule with defendant offers into court, the expected gain from trial to
the plaintiff is dependent on any offers into court made by the defendant. This is
illustrated in Figure 1 by the line Tp
DOC.  This line shows the relationship between the
expected court outcome for the plaintiff and the offer into court made by the defendant.
From equation 8, it is downward sloping12.  We show the lower limit of the
conventional settlement range under defendant offers into court by the offer into court
that makes the plaintiff’s expected return to court equal to that offer.  It is thus at point
A on Figure 1.  The top of the conventional settlement range under offers into court is
the same as it was under the English rule alone.
The refined settlement range eliminates any equilibrium dominated offers for the
defendant.  As detailed above, a defendant offer will be equilibrium dominated if it is
higher than the defendant’s expected loss from trial, Td
DOC, once that offer has been
made.  Once the defendant has made an offer into court at point B, any higher offer by
the defendant will be equilibrium dominated.  We thus have O
max at point B and the
refined settlement range is defined [O
min, O
max].
2.4 The effect of bargaining power
Following Anderson (1994) we define µp, µd as the bargaining power that each
individual (both the plaintiff and the defendant) perceives themself to have13 (0£ £µi£1, £1,
i=p,d). We make the assumption that these perceived bargaining strengths are constant.
                                               
12 If an offer into court is made that is below the minimum level of damages, xmin,  then it will have
no possible effect. Hence the lines Tp
DOC and Td
DOC follow the lines Tp and Td respectively between
zero and xmin.
13 The bargaining power that the defendant perceives the plaintiff to have is thus (1-µd) and the
bargaining power that the plaintiff perceives of the defendant is (1-µp).13
of trial and risk averse defendants will tend to accept higher plaintiff claims for the same
reason. It is thus quite likely that there will be a strong correlation between risk
aversion and bargaining power, as outlined in the preceding section. This is a point to
which we will return in the empirical analysis below.
2.6 Parameterisation of the model
This section outlines the above model in terms of the parameters and award probability
distributions used in the experiments.  Fuller experimental detail is provided in the next
section, but, to summarise, plaintiffs and defendants have common knowledge of a 75%
chance of a judge finding for the plaintiff.  In such an event, the damages awarded have
an equal probability of being anywhere between £2000 and £10000.  The total legal
costs of both sides is £6000.
In more general terms, the court award, if the case is successful, is given by a uniform
probability distribution from Xmin to Xmax.  Thus, any award in this range is equally
likely.  This allows us to express Qd(O) as:









The expected court award is simply (Xmin+Xmax)/2.  This allows us to express the





















and under the English rule with offers into court (from equation 11) as:15
3. Experimental Setup
A total of 38 participants are used over 4 sessions.  These participants are all students
at the University of Edinburgh.  Participants are randomly allocated the roles of
defendant or plaintiff on arrival and retain these roles for the entire two-hour session.
Written documentation explaining the experiment is provided15 to each participant.  The
parameterisation is that outlined in section 2.5 and Table 1.
Participants in the experiments negotiate over a computer network using software
developed by the authors for this purpose16.  The pairings are randomised from game to
game and at no time does any participant know against whom they are playing.  Three
trial games are played to allow the participants to become familiar both with the
technology employed and the nature of the experiment.
Once participants are comfortable with the arrangements, data is collected for twelve
games - three of the English rule, followed by six of the English rule with defendant
offers into court (DOC), followed by another three of the English rule.  Every
participant is given a starting amount of game money in each game  This is to pay any
costs, damages awards or settlements incurred.  It differs by participant type and is
calculated to ensure a non-negative end result for each participant.   Those assigned to
the defendant roles are given £16000 for each game, and those assigned to the plaintiff
role are given  £600017.  In each game the plaintiff has the chance to make the first
bid18.
Games last for 3 minutes each and if time runs out without a settlement being reached,
                                               
15The documentation can be found on the World Wide Web at: http://www.ed.ac.uk/~ejaa17
16Details of the software developed and used can also be found at http://www.ed.ac.uk/~ejaa17
17 For example, the worst outcome for the defendant would be to end up at trial with the judge
finding for the plaintiff (£6000 costs) and awarding maximum damages of £10000.
18A previous experiment (see Main and Park 1998) shows that varying the side who has the first bid
had no effect on either the frequency or value of settlement. For simplicity and realism, the plaintiffs
were chosen as the first player in each game.16
a trial result is imposed on those who have not settled.  Participants can also elect to go
to trial at any time during the negotiation period.  To simulate the trial process, at the
end of each game a roulette wheel is spun (36 numbers - the zero is always ignored and
the wheel respun if it comes up) and a number between one and nine taken to represent
the case being rejected, i.e., with a probability of 0.25.  If the case is accepted (any
number 10 to 36), a ball is drawn from a bingo cage containing equal numbers of balls
numbered from 20 to 100.  The value of the randomly ball represents the court award in
£100’s.  After this process is complete, each player’s screen shows their individual
‘score’ for that game.
Payment for the participants is determined by picking one of the twelve games at
random (at the end of the session) and using this game as the basis of payment for
everyone. This arrangement is designed to avoid any wealth effects arising as the
session progressed. The participant’s score in game money, in the chosen game, is
divided by a thousand to convert it to actual pounds.  In addition, all participants are
paid a £5 attendance fee.  The average payment for the two hour session is £16 for
those individuals who settled in the chosen case and £13 for those who did not,
although the total actual outcome for any individual could be anywhere between £5 and
£2719.
4. Results
The basic results are presented in Table 3 which shows the total number of settlements,
f, under the two cost allocation rules - the English rule (fE) and the English rule with
defendant offers into court (fDOC) and some basic summary statistics on the value of the
settlements, Y, again for the two rules.
We test, using a Fisher Exact Test and a Chi-square test, the null hypothesis that the
frequency of settlements under the English rule (fE) was equal to the frequency of
                                               
19 The actual payments ranged from £5 to £21 with an average of £15.40.17
settlements under the English rule with defendant offers into court (fDOC ).  The results
are presented in Table 4.  We were unable to reject this null hypothesis (that the
frequency of settlement was the same under the two cost allocation rules).
Turning to the location of the settlement point we would expect the value of the
settlements reached under the English rule (YE) to be greater than those reached under
the English rule with defendant offers into court.  Table 5 presents a standard t-test and
a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (ranksum) test of the null hypothesis that the value of the
settlements is the same under each rule against the alternate hypothesis that the value of
settlements under the English rule (YE) is larger.  It also reports a Kruksal-Wallis test of
the same null hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis that the settlements are
different.  For each of the three tests we were able to reject the null hypothesis that the
settlement levels are equal and we thus find that, as predicted, the addition of defendant
offers into court lowers the settlement value.  The rule, therefore, seems to act in the
interest of the defendant.  Note, however, that our earlier results in Table 4 suggest that
it leaves the propensity to settle unaffected.
We now consider the settlement dynamics.  The average settlement time under the
English rule was 34.3 seconds (i.e., 34.3 seconds remaining out of a total of 180
seconds allowed for negotiation) and the average settlement time under the English rule
with defendant offers into court was 38.9 seconds.  A standard t-test showed no
significant difference between these values20.
Table 6 presents the results of a multivariate analysis of the settlement propensity
observed in the experiment.  Whether or not a game ends in settlement (1/0) is analysed
in a probit as a function of various descriptors of the negotiating dyad.  These
descriptors include the type of cost shifting regime in place (Type: 1 if defendant offers
into court are available, 0 otherwise), the gender composition of the dyad (MaleFemale:
a dummy for mixed gender; and  FemaleFemale: a dummy for two women; the omitted
                                               
20  A value of t=0.2748 compared with the critical value of 1.9746 at 163 degrees of freedom.18
category being all male dyads), a risk aversion measure for each individual21 (RAD and
RAP for defendant and plaintiff respectively), and a measure of the willingness to
horse-trade or log-roll as indicated by opening bids (Spread-d and spread-p: for the
defendant and plaintiff respectively, the difference between their first two bids or the
first bid and settlement, if settlement happens directly22).
It can be seen that in all specifications the variable “Type” remains insignificant.  This
confirms the results presented above.  There is some indication of gender effects,
however, with all female dyads being markedly more likely to settle than all male dyads.
Even the presence of one woman in the negotiating dyad seems to increase the
propensity to settle significantly.  These effects are significant in a statistical and
empirical sense.  Thus, a two woman negotiating pair are here some 55.9% more likely
to settle than an all-male dyad, and the inclusion of one female increases settlement
probability by some 35.2%. Of the other influences, only the risk aversion of the
defendant has an significant impact.  More risk averse defendants increase the
probability of reaching an out-of-court settlement. It is interesting to note that the
defendants start out each game with a relatively large endowment of money. They also
face a loss frame (in Tversky and Kahneman (1986) terms) and would be expected,
other things being equal, to be more risk taking.
As mentioned in Section 2.4, one possible explanation for a failure to settle may be that
the sum of the perceived bargaining strengths of the two parties exceeds one.  To test
this hypothesis we calculate the perceived bargaining strength for each individual based
on the first six games played.  From this we are able to select which potential pairs of
subjects have a perceived bargaining strength that is statistically greater than unity (at
5%, 10%, 15% and 20% confidence).  We then use this information to predict the
results (settle or not settle) in the pairings that emerge in the remaining six games. We
                                               
21 The risk aversion measure utilised is the response to a question each participant is asked about the
most they would be prepared to pay for a 50:50 chance of winning £10.  The data used come from a
question asked at the end of the experiment when individuals do not yet know how much they have
earned, but all are guaranteed at least £5.  The participants also answer the question knowing that the
highest bidder will be asked to engage in the 50:50 gamble on a spin of the roulette wheel, albeit
being charged the value of the second highest bid for entry to the gamble.
21There was no occurrence of the first bid being accepted19
compare the actual and predicted results in each case using a sign-test.  The results are
shown in Table 7.
An examination of Table 7 shows that, broadly, as we increase the confidence level the
number of correctly predicted settles falls and the number of correctly predicted non-
settles rises.  At confidence levels up to 10% the predicted outcomes are not
statistically different from the actual outcomes
23
.  It would thus seem that a possible
reason for the failure to settle would indeed be an inconsistent perceived bargaining
strength on the part of the two sides24.
5. Conclusion
From the empirical results presented above we can confirm the earlier predictions of
Posner (1973) that the introduction of offer-dependent cost shifting rules such as
defendant offers into court makes little or no difference to the propensity to settle.
These results also support Chung (1996) who revised and modified Miller’s (1986)
original predictions regarding an expanded settlement range.  Chung demonstrates that
the settlement range is in fact shortened when one eliminates dominated offers.  This
notion of a refined settlement range suggests that there might be a lower propensity to
settle under offers into court regimes.  In our empirical experiments, we find no
statistically significant difference between the two regimes in terms of settlement
propensity.
                                               
23 It should be noted that the power of this test is very low.
24 A Heckman Selection Model, using the probit model reported earlier, is used to examine the effect
of bargaining power on settlement values.  Using the data from the final six games, the settlement
value in those cases that did settle is regressed against game type, gender of each side, risk aversion of
each side and the calculated bargaining power coefficients for each side. The only significant variables
are type and the defendant’s bargaining power, with signs in the direction expected - settlement values
are lower under defendant offers into court and high defendant bargaining power reduces the
settlement values.20
In terms of the level of settlement, however, our results do confirm earlier theoretical
analysis in that the rule is pro-defendant in lowering the size of the agreed settlements.
The empirical magnitude of the effect is, however, small, with the average settlement
falling from £6627 to £6324.  This is an important move, however, as once defendant
offers are introduced a range of possible settlements (including the £6627) are
dominated by lower offers-to-settle that the defendant can make.  The cut-off here is
£6480 and, thus, the £6324 figure can be seen to lie in the feasible range, although it
does seem that defendants do not exploit the advantage of offers into court to any
great extent.
Earlier experimental work by Coursey and Stanley (1988) examines the impact of the
American rule versus the English rule versus Rule 68 (similar to defendant offers into
court) and finds that the Rule 68 arrangement did have a tendency to shift settlements
in favour of the defendant and, under some conditions (an asymmetric award
distribution) Rule 68 was also seen to encourage settlement.
Our findings can be compared with those produced in an earlier pilot study Main
(1997), where a manual pen-and-paper experiment similar to that of Coursey and
Stanley is conducted but where there were much weaker monetary incentives.  There,
defendant offers into court produces no statistically significant impact on the
propensity to settle.  Nor, in that study, is there any statistically significant impact on
the level of settlement.  Other empirical studies in this area, such as those by Anderson
and Rowe (1996) and Rowe and Anderson (1995) have developed a simulation
approach first attempted by Rowe and Vidmar (1988), in which participants (often law
students or practising lawyers) are invited to react to certain hypothetical case
situations.  Their results generally point in the direction of defendant offer rules having
an impact on the level of settlement, but influencing the settlement process itself more
through eliciting offers in a more timely manner rather, than increasing the likelihood
of settlement itself.21
The analysis above focuses attention on the main “problem” of offer-based fee shifting
rule.  As long as they merely shift the fee burden from one party to the other, they do
little to increase the propensity to settle.  If one side is markedly more risk averse than
the other (entirely plausible in some areas where one-shot personal injury plaintiffs are
suing repeat-player insurance companies), then there may be some scope for
encouraging out of court settlement.  But this would be produced at a distributional
price of lowering the gains of the plaintiff and decreasing the costs of the defendant.
Policy proposals in Cullen (1995) and Woolf (1996) involve extending the offers into
court procedure to both sides (i.e., so that the plaintiff could make similar offers to
compromise).  If, with either defendant offers or plaintiff offers, the extra expense were
to be awarded to a third party rather than to the other side, then this may indeed
produce a genuine expansion of the settlement range.  There is considerable resistance
to such a move in the legal community, who are prepared to accept the shifting of
expenses but are resistant to the notions of fines or penalties.
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Table 2 - The conventional and refined settlement range under the two cost allocation
rules.
Conventional Settlement range Refined Settlement range
Cost rule Range Minimum Maximum Range Minimum Maximum
English rule 6000 3000 9000 - - -
English rule
(DOC)
6340 2640 9000 3840 2640 6480
Table 3 - Basic Results-
Cost Allocation Mechanism
English English with Defendant
offers into Court
Total
No of Settlements (fe, fdoc) 83 82 163
No of ‘Gone to Courts’ 31 32 63
Total 114 114 228
Value of settlements (Y)
Mean (m) 6626.5 6324.4




 Table 4 - Analysis of frequency of settlement
Hypothesis Test Statistic Critical
Value (5%)
Probability Conclusion
Ho: fe=fDOC Fisher Exact - - 1.000 Accept Ho
H1: fe„fDOC Chi-square (df=1) 0.0219 3.84 0.882 Accept Ho
  Table 5 - Analysis of settlement points












2.42 1.65 0.0078 Reject Ho
Ho : Ye = YDOC
H1: Ye „ YDOC
Kruksal-Wallis 5.845
(1df)
3.84 0.0156 Reject Ho25
Table 6 – Probit results (standard errors in parentheses) (228 observations)







Type Game type – 1 represents
defendant offers into court, 0







MaleFemale Dummy variable – 1 represents








FemaleFemale Dummy variable – 1 represents





















-3 Difference between defendant’s




-3 Difference between plaintiff’s
first and second claim.
- - 0.212
(0.107)
Goodness of Fit Statistic Chi-Squared (df) 12.042 (3) 14.553 (5) 21.35077(7)
Significance Level 0.0072399 0.012452 0.003284
Table 7 – Test of bargaining power hypothesis
Confidence Level
Sum of bargaining power coefficients greater
than one
5% 10% 15% 20%








Predicted Non-Settle/Actual Non-Settle 18 20 22 22








Predicted Non-Settle/Actual Settle 20 24 31 38
Sign-test prob. value 0.7789 0.3994 0.0928 0.0188
Conclusion
Ho: Predicted Outcomes = Actual Outcomes
H1: Predicted Outcomes „ Actual Outcomes
Accept Accept Reject Reject27
Figure 1 – Settlement ranges under the English rule and under the English rule with defendant offers into court
KEY
CSRE - Conventional Settlement
Range with English Rule
CSRDOC - Conventional
Settlement Range with
defendant offers into court
RSRDOC - Refined Settlement
Range with defendant offers
into court28
Figure 2 - Settlement possibilities under the English rule
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